THAINLAND, old Eng. law. The land which was granted by the Saxon kings to their thains or thanes was so called. Crabb's C. L. 10.
THALER. The name of a coin. The thaler of Prussia and of the northern states of Germany is deemed as money of account, at the custom-house, to be of the value of sixty-nine cents. Act of May 22, 1846.
2. The thaler of Bremen, of seventy-two grotes, is deemed of the value of seventy-one cents. Act of March 3, 1843.
THEFT, crimes. This word is sometimes used as synonymous with larceny, (q. v.) but it is not so technical. Ayliffe's Pand. 581 2 Swift's Dig. 309.
2. In the Scotch law, this is a proper and technical word, and signifies the secret and felonious abstraction of the property of another for sake of lucre, without his consent. Alison, Princ. Cr. Law of Scotl. 250.
THEFT-BOTE. The act of receiving a man's goods from the thief, after they had been stolen by him, with the intent that he shall escape punishment.
2. This is an offence punishable at common law by fine and imprisonment. Hale's P. C. 130. Vide Compounding a felony.
THEOCRACY. A species of government which claims to be immediately directed by God.
2. La religion qui, dans l'antiquite, s'associa souvent au despotisms, pour regner. par son bras ou a son ombrage, a quelquefois tents de regner seule. Clest ce qu'elle appelait le regne de Dieu, la thiocratie. Matter, De l'influence des Moeurs sur les lois, et de l'influence dos Lois sur les moeurs, 189. Religion, which in former tinies, frequently associated itself with despotism, to reign, by its power, or under its shadow, has sometimes attempted to reign alone, and this she has called the reign of God, theocracy.
THIEF, crimes. One who has been guilty of larceny or theft.
THING ADJUDGED. That which has been decided by a final judgment, by a tribu-nal of competent jurisdiction, from which there can be no appeal, either because the appeal did not lie, or because the time fixed by law for the appealing has elapsed, or because it has been confirmed on the appeal. Vide res judicata.
2. The Roman law agrees with ours, for it requires a final judgment or sentence before the decision acquires the force of the thing adjudged. Dig. 42, 1; Code, 7, 52; Extravag. 2, 27.
THINGS. By this word is understood every object, except man, which may become an active subject of right. Code du Canton de Berne, art. 332. In this sense it is opposed, in the language of the law, to the word persons. (q. v.)
2. Things, by the common raw, are divided into, 1. Things real, which are such as are permanent, fixed and immovable, and which cannot be carried from place to place; they are are usually said to consist in lands, tenements and hereditaments. 2 Bl. Com. 16; Co. Litt. 4 a to 6 b. 2. Things personal, include all sorts of things movable which attend a man's person wherever he goes. Things personal include not only things movable, but also something more, the whole of which is generally comprehended under the name of chattels. Chattels are distinguished into two kinds, namely, chattels real and chattels personal. See Chattel.
3. It is proper to remark that sometimes it depends upon the destination of certain objects, whether they are to be considered personal or real property. See Dalloz, Dict. choses, art 1, 2. Destination; Fixtures; Mill.
4. Formerly, in England, a very low and contemptuous opinion was entertained of personal property, which was regarded as only a transient commodity. But of late years different ideas have been entertained of it; and the courts, both in that country, and in this, now regard a man's personal property in a light, nearly, if not quite equal to his realty; and have adopted a more enlarged and still Iess technical mode of considering the one than the other, frequently drawn from the rules which they found already established by the Roman law, wherever those rules appear to be well-grounded and apposite to the case in question, but principally from reason and convenience, adapted to the circumstances of the times. 2 Bl. Com. 385.
5. By the Roman or civil law, things are either inpatrimonio, capable of being possessed by single persons exclusive of others; or extra patrimoiium, incapable of being so possessed.
9. Things in patrimonio are divided into corporeal and incorporeal, and the corporeal again into movable and immovable.
7. Corporeal things are those which are visible and tangible, as lands, houses, horses, jewels, and the like; incorporeal are not the object of sensation, but are the creatures of the mind, being rights issuing out of a thing corporeal, or concerning or exercisable within the same; as, an obligation, a hypothecation, a servitude, and, in general, that which consists only in a certain right. Domat, Lois Civ. Liv. Prel. t. 31 s. 2, 3; Poth. Traite dos Choses, in princ.
8. Corporeal things are either movable or immovable. The movable are those which have been separated from the earth, as felled trees, or gathered fruits, or stones dug out from quarries or those which are naturally separated, as an-imals. Immovable things are those parts of the surface of the earth, in what-ever manner thev way be distinguished, either as building;, woods, meadows, fields,or otherwise, and to whomsoever they may belong. Under the name of immovables is included everything which adheres to the surface of the earth, either by its nature, as trees; or which has been erected by the hands of man, as houses and other buildings, although, by being separated, such things way become movables. Domat, Lois Civ. Liv. Prel. tit. 3, s. 1, 5 and 6. See Movables; Immovables.
9. Things extra patrimonium are, 1. Common. 2. Public. 3. Res universitatis. 4. Res nullius.
10. - 1. Things common are, the heavens, light, air, and the sea, which cannot be appropriated by any man or set of men, so as to deprive others from the. use of them. Domat, Lois Civ. Liv. Prel. tit. 3, s. 1, 1; 1 lnst. de rer. div.; L. 2, 1, ff. de rer. div.; Ayliffe, Pand. B. 2, t. 1, in med.
11. - 2. Things public, res publicae, the property of which was in the state, and their use common to all the members of it, as navigable rivers, ways, bridges, harbors, banks, and the right of fishing.
12. - 3. Res universitatis, or things belonging to cities or bodies politic. Such things belong to the corporation or body politic in respect of the property of them; but as to their use, they appertain to those persons that are of the corporation or body politic: such may be theatres, market houses, and the like. They differ from things public, inasmuch as the latter belong to a nation. The lands or other revenue belonging to a corporation, do not fall under this class, but, are juris privati.
13. - 4. Res nullius, or things which are not the property of any man or number of men, are principally those of divine right; they are of three sorts: things sacred, things religious, and things sanct. Things sacred were those which were duly and publicly consecrated by the priests, as churches, their ornaments, &c. Things religious were those places which became so by burying in them a dead body, even though no consecration of these spots by a priest had taken place. Things sanct were those which by certain reverential awe arising from their nature, something augmented by religious ceremonies, were guarded and defended from the injuries of men; such were the gates and walls of a city, offences against which were capitally punished. 1 Bro. Civ. Law, B. 2, c. 1, p. 172.
See, in general, Domat, Lois Civ. Liv. Prel. tit. 3; 1 Bro. Civ. Law, B. 2, c. 1 Poth. Traite des Choses; Ersk. Pr. Law Scot. B. 2, tit. 1; Toullier, Droit Francais, Liv. 2, tit. 1 Ayliffe, Pand. B. 3, t. 1; Inst. 2, 1, 2 Dig. 1, 8 Bouv. Inst. Index, h. t.
THIRD PARTIES. This term includes all persons who are not parties to the contract, agrement or instrument of writing, by which their interest in the thing conveyed is sought to be affected. 1 N. S. 384. See also 2 L. R. 425 6 M. R. 528.
2. But it is difficult to give a very definite idea of third persons, for sometimes those who are not parties to the contract, but who represent the rights of the original parties, as executors, are not to be considered third person. See Duverg. tome 16, n. 34, 35, 36, et idem, tome 17, n. 190; 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 1335, et seq.
THIRLAGE, Scotch law. The name of servitude by which lands are astricted or thirled to a particular mill, and the possessors bound to grind their grain there, for the payment of certain multures and sequels as the agreed price of grinding. Ersk. Prin. B. 2, t. 9, n. 18.
THOROUGHFARE. A street or way so open that one can go through and get out of it without returning. It differs from a cul de sac, (q. v.) which is open only at one end.
2. Whether a street which is not a thoroughfare is a highway, seems not fully settled. See 1 Campb. 260; 5 Taunt. 137; 11 East, 376, n.; Hawk. P. C. B. 1, c. 76, s. 1; 5 Barn. & Ald. 456. See Dedication.
THOUGHT. The operation of the mind. No one can be punished for his mere thoughts however wicked they may be. Human laws cannot reach them, first, because they are unknown; and, secondly, unless made manifest by some action, they are not injurious to any one; but when they manifest themselves, then the act, which is the consequence, may be punished. Dig. 50 16, 225.
THREAD. A figurative expression used to signify the central line of a stream or water course. Harg. Tracts, 5; 4 Mason's Rep. 397; Holt's R. 490. Vide Filum aguae; Island; Water course; River.
THREAT, crim. law. A menace of destruction or injury to the lives or property of those against whom it is made.
2. Sending threatening letters to persons for the purpose of extorting money, is said to, be a misdemeanor at common law. Hawk. B. 1, c. 53, s. 1; 2 Russ. on Cr. 575; 2 Chit. Cr. L. 841; 4 Bl. Com. l26. To be indictable, the threat must be of a nature calculated to overcome a firm and prudent man. The party who makes a threat may be held to bail for his good behaviour. Vide Com. Dig. Battery, D; 13 Vin. Ab. 357.
THREAT, evidence. Menace.
2. When a confession is obtained from a person accused of crime, in consequence of a threat, evidence of such confession cannot be received, because, being obtained by the torture of fear, it comes in so questionable a shape, that no credit ought to be given to it; 1 Leach, 263; this is the general principle, but what amounts to a threat is not so easily defined. It is proper to observe, however, that the threat must be made by a person having authority over the prisoner, or by another in the presence of such authorized person, and not dissented from by the latter. 8 C. & P. 733. Vide Confession, and the cases there cited.
THROAT, med. jur. The anterior part of the neck. Dungl. plea. Diet. h. t.; Coop. Dict. h. t.; 2 Good's Study of Med. 302; 1 Chit. Med. Jur. 97, n.
2. The word throat, in an indictment which charged the defendant with murder, by "cutting the throat of the deceased," does not mean, and is not to be confined to that part of the neck which is scientifically called the throat, but signifies that which is commonly called the throat. 6 Carr. & Payne, 401; S. C. 25 Engl. Com. Law Rep. 458.
TICK, contracts. Credit; as, if a servant usually buy for the master upon tick, and the servant buy something without the master's order, yet, if the master were trusted by the trader, he is liable. 1 Show. 95; 3 Keb. 625; 10 Mod. 111; 3 Esp. R. 214; 4 Esp. R. 174.
TIDE. The ebb and flow of the sea.
2. Arms of the sea, bays, creeks, coves, or rivers, where the tide ebbs and flows, are public, and all persons may use the same for the purposes of navi-gation and for fishing, unless restrained by law. To give these rights at common law, the tide must ebb and flow: the flowing of the waters of a lake into a river, and their reflowing, being not the flux and reflux of the tides, but mere occasional and rare instances of a swell in the lake, and a setting up of the waters into the river, and the subsiding of such swells, is not to be considered an ebb and flow of the tide, so as to constitute a river technically navigable. 20 John. R. 98. See 17 John. R. 195; 2 Conn. R. 481.
3. In Pennsylvania, the common law principle, that the flux and reflux of the tide ascertain the character of the river, has been rejected. 2 Binn. R. 475. Vide Arm of the sea; Navigable river; Sea shore.
TIE. When two persons receive an equal number of votes at an election, there is said to be a tie.
2. In that case neither is elected. When the votes are given on any question to be decided by a deliberative assembly, and there is a tie, the question is lost. Vide Majority.
TIEL. An old manner of spelling tel. Such as nul tiel record, no such record.
TIEMPO INHABIL. A Spanish phrase used in Louisiana, to express a time when a man is not able to pay his debts.
2. A man cannot dispose of his property, at such a time, to the prejudice of his creditors. 4 N. S. 292; 3 Mart. Lo. R. 270; 10 Mart. Lo. R. 704.
TIERCE, measures. A liquid measure containing the third part of a pipe, or forty-two gallons.
TIGNI IMMITTENDI, civil law. The name of a servitude; it is the right of inserting a beam or timber from the wall of one house into that of a neighboring house, in order that it may rest on the latter, and that the wall of the latter may bear this weight. Dig. 8, 2, 36; Id. 8, 5, 14.
TIMBER TREES. According to Blackstone, oak, ash, elm, and such other trees as are commonly used for building, are considered timber. 2 Comm. 28. But it has been contended, arguendo, that to make it timber, the trees must be felled and severed from the stock. 6 Mod. 23 Stark on Slander, 79. Vide 12 Johns. R. 239; 2 Suppl. to Ves. jr.
TIME, contracts, evidence, practice. The measure of duration., It is divided into years, months. days, (q. v.) hours, minutes, and seconds. It is also divided into day and night. (q. v.)
2. Time is frequently of the essence of contracts and crimes, and sometimes it is altogether immaterial.
3. Lapse of time alone is often presumptive evidence of facts which are otherwise unknown; an uninterrupted enjoyment of certain rights for twenty or twenty-one years, is evidence that the party enjoying them is legally entitled to them; after such a length of time, the law presumes payment of a bond or other specialty. 10 S. & R. 63, 383; 3 S. & R. 493; 6 Munf. R. 532; 2 Cranch, R. 180; 7 Wheat. R. 535; 2 W. C. C R. 323; 4 John. R. 202; 7 John' R. 556; 5 Conn. 1; 3 Day 289; 1 McCord 145; 1 Bay, 482; 7 Wend. 94; 5 Verm. 236. 4. In the computation of time, it is laid down generally, that where the computation is to be made from an act done, the day when such act was done is included. Dougl. 463. But it will be excluded whenever such exclusion, will prevent a forfeiture. 4 Greenl. 298. Sed vide 15 Ves. 248; 1 Ball & B. 196. In general, one day is taken inclusively and the other exclusively. 2 Browne; Rep. 18. Vide Chitt. Bl. 140 n. 2; 2 Evans , Poth. 50; 13 Vin. Abr. 52, 499; 15 Vin. Ab. 554; 20 Vin. Ab. 266; Com. Dig. Temps; 1 Rop. Legacy, 518; 2 Suppl. to Ves. jr. 229; Graham's Pract. 185; 1 Fonbl. Equity, 430; Wright, R. 580; 7 John. R. 476; 1 Bailey, R. 89; Coxe, Rep. 363; 1 Marsh. Keny. Rep. 321; 3 Marsh. Keny. Rep. 448; 3 Bibb, R. 330; 6 Munf. R. 394; vide Computation.
TIME, pleading. The avertment of time is generally necessary in pleading; the rules are different, in different actions.
2. - 1. Impersonal actions, the pleadings must allege the time; that is, the day, month and year when each traversable fact occurred; and when there is occasion to mention a continuous act, the period of its duration ought to be shown. The necessity of laying a time extends to traversable facts only; time is generally considered immaterial, ana any time may be assigned to a given fact. This option, however, is subject to certain restrictions. 1st. Time should be laid under a videlicit, or the party pleading it will be required to, prove it strictly. 2d. The time laid should not be intrinsically impossible, or inconsistent with the fact to which it relates. 3d. There are some instances in which time forms a material point in the merits of the case; and, in these instances, if a traverse be taken, the time laid is of the substance of the issue, and must be strictly proved. With respect to all facts of this description; they must be truly stated, at the peril of a failure for variance; Cowp. 671: and here a videlicit will give no help. Id. 6 T. R 463; 5 Taunt. 2; 4 Serg. & Rawle, 576; 7 Serg. & Rawle, 405. Where the time needs not to be truly stated, (as is generally the case,) it is subject to a rule of the same nature with one that applies to venues in transitory matters, namely, that the plea and subsequent pleadings should follow the day alleged in the writ or declaration; and if in these cases no time at all be laid, the omission is aided after verdict or judgment by confession or default, by operation of the statute of jeofails. But where, in the plea or subsequent pleadings, the time happens to be material, it must be alleged, and there the pleader may be allowed to depart from the day in the writ and declaration.
3. - 2. In real or mixed actions, there is no necessity for alleging any particular day in the declaration. 3 Bl. Com. App. No. 1, 6; Lawes' Pl. App. 212; 3 Chit. Pl. 620-635; Cro. Jac. 311; Yelv. 182 a, note; 2 Chitt. Pl. 396, n. r; Gould, Pl. c. 3, 99, 100; Steph. Pl. 314; Com. Dig. Pleader, C 19.
4. - 3. In criminal pleadings, it is requisite, generally, to show both the day and the year on which the offence was committed; but the indictment will be good, if the day and year can be collected from the whole statement, though they be not expressly averred. Com. Dig. Indictm. G 2; 5 Serg. & Rawle, 315. Although it be necessary that a day certain should be laid in the indictment, the prosecutor may give evidence, of an offence committed, on any other day, previous to the finding of the indictment. 5 Serg. & Rawle, 316; Arch. Cr. Pl. 95; 1 Phil Evid. 203; 9 East, Rep. 157. This rule, however, does not authorize the laying of a day subsequent to the trial. Addis. R. 36. See generally Bouv. Inst. Index, h. t.
TIPPLING HOUSE. A place where spirituous liquors are sold and drunk in vio-lation of law. Sometimes the mere selling is considered as evidence of keeping a tippling house.
TIPSTAFF. An officer appointed by the marshal of the court of king's bench, to attend upon the judges with a kind of a rod or staff tipped with silver.
2. In the United States, the courts sometimes appoint an officer who is known by this name, whose duty it is to wait on the court and serve its process.
TITHES, Eng. law. A right to the tenth part of the produce of, lands, the stocks upon lands, and the personal industry of the inhabitants. These tithes are raised for the support of the clergy.
2. Fortunately, in the United States, the clergy can be supported by the zeal of the people for religion, and there are, no tithes. Vide Cruise, Dig. tit. 22; Ayliffe's Parerg. 504.
TITHING, Eng. law. Formerly a district containing ten men with their fam-ilies. In each tithing there was a tithing man whose duty it was to keep the peace, as a constable now is bound to do. St. Armand, in his Historical Essay on the Legislative Power of England, p. 70, expresses, an opinion that the tithing was composed not of ten common families, but of ten families of lords of a manor.
TITLE estates. A title is defined by Lord Coke to be the means whereby the owner of lands hath the just possession of his property. Co. Lit. 345; 2 Bl. Com. 195. Vide 1 Ohio Rep. 349. This is the definition of title to lands only.
2. There are several stages or degrees requisite to form a complete title to lands and tenements. 1st. The lowest and most imperfect degree of title is the mere possession, or actual occupation of the estate, without any apparent right to hold or continue such possession; this happens when one man disseises another. 2 Bl. Com. 195. 2dly. The next step to a good and perfect title is the right of possession, which may reside in one man, while the actual possession is not in himself, but in another. This right of possession is of two sorts; an apparent right of possession, which may be defeated by proving a better; and an actual right of possession, which will stand the test against all opponents. Idem. 196. 3dly. The mere right of property, the jus proprietatis without either possession or the right of possession. Id. 197.
3. A title is either good, marketable, doubtful, or bad.
4. A good title is that which entitles a man by right to a property or estate, and to the lawful possession of the same.
5. A marketable title is one which a court of equity considers to be so clear that it will enforce its acceptance by a purchaser. The ordinary acceptation of the term marketable title, would convey but a very imperfect notion of its legal and technical import.
6. To common apprehension, unfettered by the technical and conventional distinction of lawyers, all titles being either good or bad, the former would be considered marketable, the latter non-marketable. But this is not the way they are regarded in courts of equity, the distinction taken there being not between a title which is absolutely good or absolutely bad, but between a title, which the court considers to be so clear that it will enforce its acceptance by a purchaser, and one which the court will not go so far as to declare a bad title, but only that it is subject to so much doubt that a purchaser ought not to be compelled to accept it. 1 Jac. & Walk. R. 568. In short, whatever may be the private opinion of the court, as to the goodness of the title yet if there be a reasonable doubt either as to a matter of law or fact involved in it, a purchaser will not be compelled to complete his purchase; and such a title, though it may be perfectly secure and unimpeachable as a holding title is said, in the current language of the day, to be unmarketable. Atkins on Tit.2.
7. The doctrine of marketable titles is purely equitable and of modern ori-gin. Id. 26. At law every title not bad is marketable. 6 Taunt. R. 263; 5 Taunt. R. 625; S. C. 1 Marsh., R. 258. See Dalzell v. Crawford, 2 Penn. Law Journ. 17.
8. A doubtful title is one which the court does not consider to be so clear that it will enforce its acceptance by a purchaser, nor so defective as to declare it a bad title, but only subject to so much doubt that a purchaser ought not to be compelled to accept it. 1 Jac. & Walk. R. 568; 9 Cowen, R. 344; vide Title, Marketable.
9. At common law, doubtful, titles are unknown; there every title must be either good or bad. Atkins on Tit. 17. See Dalzell v. Crawford, 2 Penn. Law Journ. 17.
10. A bad title is one which conveys no property to a purchaser of an estate.
11. Title to real estate is acquired by two methods, namely, by descent and by purchase. (See these words.)
12. Title to personal property may accrue in three different ways. By original acquisition. 2. By transfer, by act of law. 3. By transfer, by, act of the parties.
13. - 1. Title by original acquisition is acquired, 1st. By occupancy. This mode of acquiring title has become almost extinct in civilized governments, and it is permitted to exist only in those few special cases, in which it may be consistent with the public good. First. Goods taken by capture in war were, by the common law, adjudged to belong to the captor, but now goods taken from enemies in time of war, vest primarily in the sovereign, and they belong to the individual captors only to the extent and under such regulations, as positive laws may prescribe. Finch's Law, 28, 178 Bro. tit. Property, pl. 18, 38; 1 Wilson, 211; 2 Kent, Com. 290, 95. Secondly. Another instance of acquisition by occupancy, which still exists under certain limitations, is that of goods casually lost by the owner, and unreclaimed, or designedly abandoned by him; and in both these cases they belong to the fortunate finder. 1 Bl. Com. 296. See Derilict.
14. - 2d. Title by original acquisition is acquired by accession. See Accession.
15. - 3d. It is acquired by intellectual labor. It consists of literary pro-perty as the construction of maps and charts, the writing of books and papers. The benefits arising from such labor are secured to the owner. 1. By patent rights for inventions. See Patents. 2. By copyrights. See Copyrights.
16. - 2. The title to personal property is acquired and lost by transfer, by act of law, in various ways. 1. By forfeiture. 2. By succession. 3. By marriage. 4. By judgment. 5. By insolvency. 6. By intestacy.
17. - 3. Title is also acquired and lost by transfer by the act of the party. 1. By gift. 2. By contract or sale.
18. In general, possession constitutes the criterion of title of personal property, because no other means exist by which a knowledge of the fact to whom it belongs can be attained. A seller of a chattel is not, therefore, required to show the origin of his title, nor, in general, is a purchaser, with-out notice of the claim of the owner, compellable to make restitution; but, it seems, that a purchaser from a tenant for life of personal chattels, will not be secure against the claims of those entitled in remainder. Cowp. 432; 1 Bro. C. C. 274; 2 T. R. 376; 3 Atk. 44; 3 V. & B. 16.
19. To the rule that possession is the criterion of title of property may be mentioned the case of ships, the title of which can be ascertained by the register. 15 Ves. 60; 17 Ves. 251; 8 Price, R. 256, 277.
20. To convey a title the seller must himself have a title to the property which is the subject of the transfer. But to this general rule there are exceptions. 1. The lawful coin of the United States will pass the property along with the possession. 2. A negotiable instrument endorsed in blank is transferable by any person holding it, so as by its delivery to give a good title "to any person honestly acquiring it." 3 B. & C. 47; 3 Burr. 1516; 5 T. R. 683; 7 Bing. 284; 7 Taunt. 265, 278; 13 East, 509; Bouv. Inst. Index, h. t.
TITLE, legislation That part of an act of the legislature by which it is known, and distinguished from other acts the name of the act.
2. A practice has prevailed of late years to crowd into the same act a mass of heterogeneous matter, so that it is almost impossible to describe, or even to allude to it in the title of the act. This practice has rendered the title of little importance, yet, in some cases, it is material in the construction of an act. 7 East, R. 132, 134; 2 Cranch, 386. See Lord Raym. 77; Hard. 324; Barr. on the Stat. 499, n.
TITLE, persons. Titles are distinctions by which a person is known.
3. The constitution of the United States forbids the tyrant by the United States, or any state of any title of nobility. (q. v.) Titles are bestowed by courtesy on certain officers; the president of the United States sometimes re-ceives the title of excellency; judges and members of congress that of honor-able; and members of the bar and justices of the peace are called esquires. Cooper's, Justinian, 416'; Brackenridge's Law Miscell. Index, h. t.
3. Titles are assumed by foreign princes, and, among their subjects they may exact these marks of honor, but in their intercourse with foreign nations they are not entitled to them as a matter of right. Wheat. Intern. Law, pt. 2, c. 3, 6.
TITLE, Iiterature. The particular division of a subject, as a law, a book, and the like; for example, Digest, book 1, title 2; for the law relating to bills of exchange, see Bacon's Abridgment, title Merchant.
TITLE, rights. The name of a newwpaper a book, and the like.
3. The owner of a newspaper, having particular title, has a right to such title, an an injunction will lie to prevent its use un lawfully by another. 8 Paige, 75. See Pardess. n. 170.
TITLE, pleading, rights. The right of action which the plaintiff has; the declaration must show the plaintiff's title, and if such title be not shown in that instrument, the defect cannot be cured by any of the future pleadings. Bac. Ab. Pleas, &c. B 1.
TITLE DEEDS. Those deeds which are evidences of the title of the owner of an estate.
2. The person who is entitled to the inheritance has a right to the possession of the title deeds. 1 arr. & Marsh. 653.
TITLE OF A DECLARATION, pleading. At the top of every declaration the name of the court is usually stated, with the term of which the declaration is filed, and in the margin the venue, namely, the city or county where the cause is intended to be tried is set down. The first two of these compose what is called the title of the declaration. 1 Tidd's Pr. 866.